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AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND LAW OF
CORPORATIONS-PART III.
The Relations Between a Stock Corporation, its Directors, Stock-
holders and Third Persons.
Assuming the corporation to be properly organized and
administered, these relations would seem to be very simple
and completely determined by our previous discussion. A
corporation we have found to consist of the persons authorized
to act in its name, that is to say, in the case of a stock com-
pany, for almost all purposes, of the directors. It therefore
follows, in the absence of special statutes, that in the directors
are vested all the powers of the corporation, and that they ex-
ercise them, not as the agents of the stockholders as ordinarily
assumed, but as principals, from which it further follows that,
so long as the directors act in good faith for corporate pur-
poses, they are subject to no control and need no special au-
thority from stockholders or others. But since, like trustees,
they are natural persons, exercising the powers and adminis-
tering the assets of an artificial person for the benefit of third
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persons (the stockholders), they, like trustees, may be en-
joined from acting in fraud of the corporation or from other-
wise wasting its assets. The stockholders, as contributors-
and ultimate owners of the corporate funds, contributed only
to be used in good faith for corporate purposes, have the right
to see that such funds are so applied, and to that end have
standing in court. If the funds have already been wasted, the
situation is a little more difficult; since, although the corpo-
ration plainly possesses the right to sue the directors on ac-
count of their fraudulent acts, yet as a corporation consists
of the directors, such remedy would seem to be insufficient.
The courts, however, to meet this difficulty, properly allow in
such cases the stockholders to institute proceedings in the
name of the corporation. Excepting, however, this right to
proceed against the directors in cases of fraud or waste, the
stockholders would seem logically to have no rights as re-
gards the directors except those granted by the statute or
reserved in the charter, such, for instance, as the right to elect
or remove directors, to authorize mortgages, to amend the
charter, to dissolve the corporation, etc., or any liability to
third persons except such stockholders' liability as may be
imposed by the statute. The relations between the corpora-
tion itself and third persons should be even more simple. A
corporation existing in the law as an artificial person, the
subject of the general property rights, the dealings of third
persons with it, should be governed by the common law ap-
plicable to like dealings between natural persons, such third
persons being in nowise concerned with the various relations
between the corporation, its directors and stockholders. But,
as a matter of fact, the law governing the dealings between
third persons and corporations has been much perverted by
the establishment of the doctrine known as "ultra vires,"
according to which a corporation possesses only those powers
especially conferred by the charter or necessarily incident to
the corporate purpose; any acts not founded on such powers
being held ultra vires and void.
This doctrine cannot be said to be satisfactorily established,
for so contrary is it both to the nature of a corporation ana
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the rights of third persons dealing therewith, that the courts
have never been able to enforce it to its furthest'extent. The
courts have never gone to the logical length of holding a
contract executed on both sides voidable on the part of the
corporation, thus enabling the latter to recover any considera-
tion it may have given on account thereof; but they have
sometimes held contracts executed by third. persons voidable
by the corporation, thus enabling the corporation, while re-
taining the benefit, to withhold the consideration. To conceal
this conflict between the justice and the supposed necessity of
the case, the courts have created the fiction that all persons
dealing with a corporation do so with full knowledge of the
extent and limitation of its corporate powers, and that, there-
fore, there is no such thing as an innocent party to an ultra
sires contract--a fiction founded on a recognized principle of
public policy in a case of public corporations, but which
cannot be maintained in the case of private corporations, in
the face of the well-known fact that not one person out of a
hundred dealing therewith has any knowledge of the corporate
charter. Private corporations are innumerable, and they do
business all over the commercial world without reference to
the State of their creation, and it is in the nature of the case
impossible that the public should be informed as to the pro-
visions of their various charters. This extraordinary doc-
trine, having its origin in a total misconception of the true
nature of a corporation, is bolstered up through the confusing
by the courts of acts ultra vires with acts contrary to public
policy, and the acts of private with the acts of public corpo-
rations. The law of corporations has no special concern with
the doctrine of law declaring contracts contrary to public policy
void, as this latter doctrine is but the general law of the land,
applicable alike to artificial and natural persons; and yet the
courts, and especially the Supreme Court of the United States,
in passing upon cases in which corporations, and especially
quasi-public corporations, such as railivays, have entered into
contracts contrary to public policy, have based their decisions,
properly holding such contracts void, upon the lack of power
of the corporations to make them, rather than upon the in-
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herent illegality of the contracts themselves. Take, for in-
instance, the leading case of The Central Transportation Com-
pany v. The Pullman Car Comnpany.' Here a quasi-public.
corporation, the Central Transportation Company of Pennsyl-
vania, chartered for the transportation of passengers, etc., en-
tered into a contract with the Pullman Palace Car Company
of Illinois, agreeing, among other things, "not to engage in
the business of manufacturing, using or hiring sleeping cars,"
thus in effect abandoning the duty which it owed the public.
This contract, therefore, was void as contrary to public policy,
and the Supreme Court, in deciding the case, so finds, but,
nevertheless, rests its decision upon the general doctrine of*
ultra vires applicable to all corporations and all contracts,
rather than upon the special circumstances of the case. It
will be noted, in reading the opinion, that almost, if not all,
the cases cited are either cases of like failure upon the part of
quasi-public corporations to discharge their duty to the public,
or are cases of ultra ires acts on the part of cities; yet all
such cases are cited, as if the doctrine therein laid down was
applicable to all corporations. But even in this case the court
gives a proper definition of ultra ires contracts in the state-
ment that they are such contracts as are "outside the object
of its (the corporation's) creation as defined by the law of its
organization," but, unfortunately, immediately draws the erro-
neous deduction that they are "therefore beyond the power
conferred upon it by the legislature ;" and then goes on to
state that "the objection to the contract is not merely that
the corporation ought not to have made it, but that it could
not make it," although it is perfectly plain that the only ob-
jection to the contract in question in that case was that, for
public reasons, the corporation ought not to have made it.
This case, one of the leading cases in this country on the sub-
ject, shows very plainly the reason which has led the courts
to establish this ultra sires doctrine upon an erroneous basis.
The courts have entirely failed to distinguish between what
corporations ought not to do and what they have not the
139 U. S. 24, 59.
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power to do. There are evidently many things that a corpo-
.ration should not do as being outside the purpose for which
its capital was contributed by the stockholders, although en-
tirely within the powers of the corporation as a person exist-
ing in the law. Of course, if the purpose of the contract be
contrary to. public policy, then, as in the case above cited,
such contract is for such reason void, or if a municipal
corporation enter into a contract outside the purpose of its
organization, such contract is evidently voidable on the gen-
eral ground that such corporations are not bound by the un-
authorized acts of their agents. But such doctrine is not ap-
plicable to private corporation, and, therefore, plainly such
corporations should be bound by all acts of the directors or
corporate agents within the corporate powers, whether within
the purpose of corporate organization or not. What these
powers are, our previous inquiry has already determined. A
corporation is an artificial person, existing in the law as the
subject of the general property rights, and, therefore, subject,
of course, to the right of the State to limit or enlarge them,
is possessed of all the common law powers incident thereto.
A corporation possesses the power to buy, to sell and to hold
real and personal property, to borrow and repay money, to
employ labor, to enter into contracts, etc., and, therefore, any
act done or contract entered into by it in the exercise of any
of such powers, is binding upon it, although such act or con-
tract does not conduce to the purpose for which the corpora-
tion is organized. In such latter case we have found that the
stockholders have a right to enjoin such action on the part of
the corporation; but, nevertheless, if such act has been per-
formed, or such contract entered into with an innocent third
person without knowledge on his part of the improper pur-
pose thereof, such corporation should evidently be bound
thereby. The powers of persons at common law are simple
and not complex (the right of purchase is a general abstract
right and does not consist in the right to purchase one thing
rather than another, or for one purpose rather than another),
and of such nature also should the courts hold the powers of
corporations.
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
The absurdity of treating the powers of a corporation as
limited by its purposes is well illustrated by the case of The
Fort Worth City Co. v. The South Bridge Co.' In this case
a land company, although not vested by its charter with anyr
special power to that end, contracted with a bridge company
for the purchase of a bridge to be used on a public highway
leading to the property which the land company was develop-
ing. At the suit of the bridge company for the contract
price of the bridge, the land company, among other defences,
alleged that the contract was beyond the special powers con-
ferred on it by its charter and was, therefore, null and void.
The court, Chief Justice Fuller, controlled it may be
assumed by the requirements of justice, properly held the
land company liable, but only upon the finding of fact that the
construction of such bridge was one of the desirable means of
developing the property held by it; leaving it to be inferred
as, indeed, the doctrine of ultra zires would require, that if*
the construction of such bridge has not, as a matter of fact,
been a proper means to that end, as to which fact the land
company had full knowledge and the bridge company none at
all, the bridge company and not the land company would have
had to sustain the loss resulting from the building of a useless
bridge. Plainly, in this case, the court should not have con-
cerned itself with the question of the utility of the bridge, but
should have held the land company liable upon the ground
that the corporation possessing the power of purchase 'and
having ordered the bridge, was liable to pay therefor, irre-
spective of the use to which it was put. Of course, however,
should a corporation enter into an improper contract with a
party having knowledge thereof, such contract should not be
enforced, for in such case such party would be a party to the
fraud on the corporation and fraud vitiates all contracts. But
such knowledge, as in other cases of fraud, should be found
as a fact and not presumed as a matter of law, although in
many cases, as if, for instance, a charitable institution specu-
lated through a broker, such knowledge might well be inferred
1 51 U. S. 294.
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as a fact from the circumstances of the case. Even, indeed, if
a corporation should be deprived by its charter of any general
power, as, for instance, of the power to take or hold land, in
the absence of any general law or public policy controlling the
matter, persons dealing with such corporation should have the
right to assume that it was not an exception to the rule, but
that it was vested with the general property rights, and, there-
fore, in the absence of any special knowledge, such persons
should be allowed to hold the corporation responsible for its
ultra vires acts. On the contrary, however, it is equally true
that if the powers of any special class of corporations, such as
national banks for instance, are limited by general laws, such
limitations, in accordance with the established doctrine of the
common law, are binding on all persons. But the same con-
siderations and the same- corporate theory which should
thus protect innocent persons against loss through the
wrongful acts of persons composing a corporation, demand
that such persons acting thus wrongfully should be held
accountable to the corporation itself. It does not follow,
however, that they should be held accountable for mere
mistakes of judgment as to what acts do or do not serve
the corporate purpose, but only when the corporate assets are
wasted through their negligence or bad faith. This ques-
tion of the responsibility of the directors of a corporation for
their wrongful acts is often further complicated by the assent
thereto of a number or all of the stockholders. It is clear that
if every stockholder assented, they and through them the
corporation, should be estopped from recovery, but it seems
equally clear that any one innocent stockholder should have
the right through the corporation to proceed against the
directors, leaving the directors to whatever action they might
have against their co-directors or assenting stockholders. To
be sure, it would seem that the general doctrine that joint tort-
feasors cannot enforce contribution against each other, would
prevent such directors as were originally compelled to make
good to the corporation the loss resulting from their wrongful
acts, from recovering anything from their co-directors or from
the stockholders participating therein, but the same pubic
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policy which is the basis of the doctrine above mentioned,
certainly sustains this application thereof The knowledge on
the part of the directors that, irrespective of the assent of even
a majority of the stockholders, they will be held personally
liable to the corporation for any loss it may sustain through
their wrongful acts, will tend strongly to restrain them in the
exercise of their trust.
All this proceeds on the assumption that a corporation is
incorporated and organized in accordance with law; otherwise
different questions arise. But such questions are easily deter-
mined if the proper nature of a corporation is born in mind.
Take first the case of a body of men assuming to act as a
corporation without authority of law. It is perfectly plain
that if such persons so act without even a bonafide attempt to
comply with the corporate law or for a purpose that is contrary
to public policy, then their action is neither more nor less than
a fraud upon the State, and they should not be permitted to
screen themselves behind the corporate name, but should be
held to their common law liability as individuals. But return
to our definition, we see that the persons to whom the above
statement applies are not the stockholders but the directors,
since it is the latter, and not the former, who are empowered
to assume to act under the corporate name; the stockholders,
like the public, having been deceived, the latter into dealing
with a fraudulent corporation, the former into subscribing for
its stock. While the directors should, therefore, be held
personally responsible to both the public and to the stock-
holders for any damages suffered by them through the
fraudulent corporation, under no principle of law can innocent
stockholders be held responsible therefor. As, already found,
in no sense are the directors the agents of either the corpora-
tion or of the stockholders, and therefore the stockholders,
even of an illegal corporation, cannot be said to have author-
ized the directors to act as their agents. Nor can they be held
liable as partners fraudulently doing business under the cor-
porate name, for as already found it is the directors and not the
stockholders who occupy such position. The stockholders
are not partners in fact since such is not the contract
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between them, nor should they be presumed to be such
in law in the absence of any authority or right, apparent or
real, on the part of any one of them to act on their joint behalf.
As already said, it is the directors who. hold themselves out to
the public as authorized to act in the corporate name, and it is
therefore they and not the stockholders who, if the corporation
be non-existent, should be presumed in law to be partners. Yet
the above considerations do not seem to go to the extent of
relieving the stockholder from liability upon their stock sub-
scriptions, for, although they have not in anywise constituted
the directors their agents to conduct a commercial enterprise for
them as principals, nevertheless they certainly have entrusted
them with funds to be applied to such purpose, and their rights,
therefore, should be subordinate to those of the creditors to
whom such funds have been- equitable pledged by way of carry-
ing on such enterprise. As against the corporation and its
directors, the stockholders should be permitted to disaffirm a
contract of subscription entered into under a mistake of fact pro-
vided such disaffirmance is made promptly upon the discovery of
such mistake; but as regards the public, who have dealt with
such alleged corporation, relying upon the funds contributed
or subscribed to it by the stockholders, the latter should be
estopped from setting up the illegality of such stock subscrip-
tions in defence of any action that might be brought against
them or the corporation for or on behalf of innocent creditors.
As regards the status of such pretended corporation itself,
having no legal existence, no proceedings in the nature of
quo warranto by the State are necessary to dissolve it, but its
affairs will be wound up by a court of equity at the instance
of any person interested in its affairs, or its non-existence may
be set up by any third person in defence of any action brought
in its name. But it does not follow from this that persons
who, in their dealings with such pretended corporation have
obtained possession of moneys or other properties properly
belonging to the persons acting under such corporate name,
should be permitted to maintain possession thereof as against
these latter persons. On the contrary, under the general legal
principle which holds all persons responsible for all moneys or
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
other properties coming into their possession which properly
belong to another, they should be held liable therefor at the
suit of such pretended incorporators as individuals.
So much for the case where the corporators cannot be said
to be acting in good faith, but evidently where such* cor-
porators are acting in good faith and for a proper purpose,
although having failed to comply with some provision of the
statute authorizing the formation of the corporation, then other
considerations apply, and in the absence of any special damage
to any persons there would seem to be no reason why the
courts, in order to maintain the rights of all persons con-
cerned, should not hold all persons except the State estopped
from denying the legal existence of the corporation. Although
corporations were and are, as already seen, illegal at common
law, yet the State having, through its legislation, recognized
the policy of permitting persons to carry on certain commercial
enterprises as an artificial person under an assumed name, the
courts, certainly, in furtherance of such policy, may, when
public convenience, equity and justice alike require it, recog-
nize persons as a corporation who are in good faith acting as
such for a legal purpose; and so the courts have done, and
treat such pretended corporations as corporations de facto
although not dejure. A corporation defacto may, therefore,
be defined as the artificial person existing in contemplation of
law by virtue of the bona fide undertaking by various persons
to act as a corporation in accordance with the law and policy
of the State.
A still different condition of affairs results when a corpora-
tion, although properly incorporated, undertakes to transact
business without the capital required by its .charter. The
State, in creating a stock corporation, but confers upon various
individuals the power to carry on a commercial enterprise
under an assumed name by means of a fixed capital divided
into transferable shares. The amount of capital is set forth in
the charter that persons dealing with the corporation may have
knowledge of its financial standing, that irresponsible com-
panies may not masquerade as responsible concerns, that
corporations should not be mere frauds and shams by which
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individuals should be enabled to avoid their common law
responsibilities and defraud the public. If, however, the legal
requirement expends itself when the corporation declares a
nominal capital, not demanding that such capital should
actually exist as a condition precedent to the prosecution of
the business, then it becomes but an additional snare and trap
for the public deceived by such statement. Better that the
corporation should not declare its capital, that the public
should have no information with regard thereto and should
knowingly deal therewith at its peril, than that it should be
misinformed, that it should be lead to believe that a corpora-
tion possessed a large capital, when in reality it might possess
little or none. The State, in fixing the capital or in requiring
it to be publicly fixed, plainly makes the acquirement of such
capital a condition precedent to the transaction of business, if
not, indeed, to the very existence of the corporation itself.
The State but authorizes the corporators to carry on a certain
commercial enterprise under the corporate name by means of
the capital stated; unless therefore provided with such capital,
the corporators act at their own risk and without authority, and
should not be permitted to screen themselves behind a charter
with the most important provision of which they have failed
to comply, but should be held to their individual common
law liability.
But, as has already been found in the case of persons as-
suming to act as a corporation without authority of law, it is
the directors not the stockholders who so act, and who, there-
fore, should be held responsible personally as partners there-
for. The stockholders, like the public, may be assumed to
be deceived by the directors, and there would seem to be no
equity in holding them personally liable, not for their own,
but for the directors' acts, except, as already found, to the ex-
tent to which they may have agreed to contribute to the cor-
porate capital. And, indeed, this is recognized by the court, and
in some States such limitations are even imposed by statute,while
at the same time the courts have gone very far in holding such
stockholders liable to the full par value of the stock taken by
them, properly holding that the amount payable therefor is in
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the nature of a trust fund, pledged for payment of the corpo-
rate obligations. Evidently, however, the creditors are enti-
tled to something more than this limited right of redress-
against the stockholders, when they have been injured by the
action of the dircctors in conducting the business of the cor-
poration before the legal requirements as to capital have been
by them complied with. If all the stock has not been sub-
scribed, the full payment of all the subscriptions will not fur-
nish the corporation with as large a fund applicable to the
payment of its debts as the law requires, and which the cred-
itors, therefore, have the right to demand; while if some of
the stock has been subscribed for by irresponsible persons,
the creditors should evidently not be put to the expense,
delay and difficulty of pursuing the individual stockholders,
nor be compelled to take the risk of any failure to collect
from any such the par value of his stock.
But the matter needs no further discussion, since plainly
the directors having, without complying with a condition pre-
cedent thereto, undertaken the prosecution of the business of
the corporation to the resulting loss and injury of third per-
sons, are and should be held, legally and equitably, personally
responsible to them for such unauthorized act. It would not,
indeed, seem extreme, under such circumstances, to deny the
directors the right to set up their corporate capacity in defence
of any action brought against them personally, and thus hold
them responsible for all the debts of the corporation; but the
demands ofjustice would seem to be met if they were compelled
to make good to the corporation and its creditors the fund
without which they had no right to transact business in a cor-
porate capacity. The same reasoning applies to the case
where the stock of the corporation has been all subscribed
for and issued as full paid, when in fact the consideration
therefor was not cash, but either of a nominal character or
consisted of rights and properties of less than such par value.
In such case, unless such issue for other than cash is author-
ized by law, the same is illegal and must be held to be at the
risk of the directors who so issue, and of the stockholders
who so pay their subscriptions; and, therefore, unless said
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property realizes to the corporation in cash the full par value
of the stock issued therefor, such directors should be held lia-
ble for the entire deficit, and each stockholder for the balance
of his subscription, at the suit of the corporation or of any
creditor. If, however, such issue for other than cash is au-
thorized by statute, and such statute has been in all respects
complied with, and such property has been in good faith given
and accepted as of the full par value of and in full payment
for the stock issued, no liability would arise on the part of
anyone, even though such property is subsequently found to
'be inadequate in value; while on the contrary, if the statute
has been evaded or the property knowingly overvalued, this
constitutes a fraud invalidating the entire transaction, where-
fore the directors, as before, should be held personally respon-
sible to the creditors to the extent of the authorized capital,
and such stockholders who have received their stock for less
than its par value should be held responsible for the unpaid
portion of their subscription. The authorities properly hold
that the question in such case is one of good faith.
The law as stated above, and especially the doctrine of the
primary liability of directors, would seem to be the necessary
consequence of the nature of corporations as disclosed. The
courts, however, do not recognize such personal liability on
the part of the directors, and it is not law. Both the Bench
and Bar have been misled by the assumption that the persons
authorized to act as a corporation are thereby constituted not
the corporation but its agents, and by the further assumption
that if any persons could be said to be the corporation, they
were the stockholders and not the directors. Having put the
directors in the possession of mere agents, the courts have
been unable to hold them to that primary and personal re-
sponsibility which is properly theirs, and which equity and
justice demand should be imposed upon them. Yet, although
released at law, it is the directors and not the stockholders
who at the bar of public opinion are held responsible for cor-
porate frauds, and it is to the character and position of the di-
rectors, and not that of the stockholders, that the public look
for its estimate of corporate responsibility. The feeling of the
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public, indeed, with reference to the nature of a corporation, is
much nearer the truth than the accepted theory of law. So
contrary, indeed, to the real nature of corporations is the legal
assumption that it is the directors and not the -stockholders
who are responsible for improper corporate acts, that the
courts have usually been compelled, upon one plea or another,
to release the stockholders from such liability, with the unfor-
tunate result that innocent third persons, defrauded by per-'
sons pretending to act as the corporation, have often had no
redress except against the empty corporate treasury. If, how-
ever, the courts but held the directors to that responsibility
which is properly theirs, full justice would be done and third
persons and stockholders alike protected-as in such case the
public would be justified in relying upon the character of the
directors, instead of being ensnared thereby to its loss.
It is now probably too late to expect the courts to reverse
the unfortunate position assumed by them, but it is to be
hoped that the present evil may be cured by statute. Let the
legislature but once impose upon corporate directors the re-
sponsibility which in justice and in law should be theirs, and
fraudulent corporations would surely become things of the
past, since being known by their directors, they would be
incapable of injury.
Henry Winslow Williams.
Baltimore, October, x898.
